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Abstract. We present a Bayesian method for the identification and classification of objects from
sets of astronomical catalogs, given a predefined classification scheme. Identification refers here
to the association of entries in different catalogs to a single object, and classification refers to
the matching of the associated data set to a model selected from a set of parametrized models
of different complexity. By the virtue of Bayes’ theorem, we can combine both tasks in an efficient
way, which allows a largely automated and still reliable way to generate classified astronomical
catalogs. A problem to the Bayesian approach is hereby the handling of exceptions, for which no
likelihoods can be specified. We present and discuss a simple and practical solution to this problem,
emphasizing the role of the “evidence” term in Bayes’ theorem for the identification of exceptions.
Comparing the practice and logic of Bayesian classification to Bayesian inference, we finally note
some interesting links to concepts of the philosophy of science.
Keywords: Astronomical catalogs; Data reduction: mathematical procedures; Probability theory:
inference methods; Philosophy of science
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INTRODUCTION
The identification and classification of objects from a set of independent catalogs is
a key task for making astronomical data usable for scientific analysis. The standard
approach here is to solve this problem step by step using to use hierarchical “best-
match” algorithms, as exemplified in the cross-identification of radio sources [1] from
the VizieR database of astronomical catalogs [2]. Although such algorithms are fast and
efficient in low-level applications, they have limitations in dealing with ambiguities and
considering object classes with different levels of complexity. This is illustrated in the
recent production of the band-merged version [3] of the Planck Early Release Compact
Source Catalog (ERCSC) [4], and the variability classification of ERCSC objects using
WMAP data [5].
Motivated by this, we present here a Bayesian approach to object identification and
classification, based on data from a set of astronomical catalogs taken, e.g., at different
frequencies or by different observatories. In this method, we consider not only positional
coincidence between catalog entries, but also the properties of known object classes, and
use both as criteria for the identification and simultaneous classification of objects. The
current paper focuses on the mathematical basics of this method, with some typical
choices for priors and likelihoods needed for catalog generation. Applications to data,
and a more detailed comparison with standard approaches will follow in future work.
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BAYESIAN ASSOCIATION AND CLASSIFICATION
Terms and Definitions
Notational Conventions. We understand probability P in the Bayesian sense as an
operator which assigns a value of plausibility, 0 ≤ P(S) ≤ 1, to a statement S, and
we introduce the information Hamiltonian [6] for a condition X on S as H(X|S) ≡
− logP(S|X). Data (factual information) shall be denoted by blackboard-bold symbols
(e.g., D), models (abstract beliefs) by calligraphic symbols (e.g., M). We denote a set of
logically independent statements as {Sj}⊥ and define for any condition X
P({Sj}⊥|X)≡
∏
jP(Sj|X) . (1)
A set of mutually exclusive statements shall be denoted with {Sj}≀ with the definition
P({Sj}≀|X)≡
∑
jP(Sj |X) . (2)
If a set on mutually exclusive statements is exhaustive, we call it a complete set of
alternatives {{Sj}}≀, with P({{Sj}}≀|X) = 1. The operator N({Sj}) gives the number of
elements of a set with j > 0, a set containing a zero-indexed element is denoted {S0,Sj}.
Structure of Data and Associations. From a set of positions taken from a highly
reliable seed catalog we select within a radius ∆j potentially associated data D= {Dj}⊥
from N(D) independent target catalogs, where the seed catalog may be included as the
zero-indexed element, D0. The entries of each target catalog j form a complete set of
alternatives, Dj = {{Dj0,Djk}}≀, where Dj0 = {σj0,νj} stands for the non-observation
in the catalog j with noise level σj0 and signal-to-noise limit νj , together with N(Dj)
data entries Djk = {Djk0,Djki}⊥. Djk0 = {θjk,δjk} denote the positional distance of a
data entry to the nominal seed coordinates and its error, while Djki = {fjki,σjki} contain
N(Djk) physical parameters and their errors. Finally, we define an association αℓ as a
mapping determining one entry Djαℓj of each catalog j, and denote αℓD ≡ {Djαℓj}⊥.
Obviously, associations form a complete set of alternatives, α= {{αℓ}}≀.
Models, Parameters and the Classification Scheme. Classification is based on a set
of mutually exclusive models M = {Mn}≀, each providing a physical description of a
known object class as a set of functions µni(xj ;ω) that can be compared to the data values
fjki. xj is a physical quantity mapping a model prediction on a particular catalog (e.g.,
nominal frequency), and ω is a vector in the model parameter space Ωn of dimension
dimΩn. The (prior) probability assigned to a model is understood as a marginalization
over the model parameter space, i.e., P(Mn) =
∫
Ωn
dω pn(ω), where pn(ω) is called the
parameter p.d.f. of Mn.
A priori, we cannot assume that {Mn}≀ is exhaustive. This would mean P(M) < 1,
which poses a problem for the proper normalization of Bayesian posterior probabilities.
We therefore introduce the classification scheme C as a set of conditions that allows
us to treat M as an exhaustive set, and write P(M|C) = 1 and M|C ≡ {{Mn}}≀. In a
more general sense, C can be understood as the framework of factual information (data),
beliefs (theories and ancillary hypothesis) and decisions (e.g., how to classify objects),
which enables us to define and delimit our set of models M|C.
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Application of Bayes’ Theorem
Separating Association and Classification. The posterior probability for a candidate
object αℓMn can be written under application of the product rule as
P(αℓMn|DC) =P(Mn|αℓDC)P(αℓ|K) . (3)
The posterior probability of an association depends only on the set of coordinates which
we denote by K, and we can omit C in the condition of this term. By application of
Bayes’ theorem, both terms can be separately transformed as
P(Mn|αℓDC) = P(αℓD|MnC)P(Mn|C)
P(αℓD|C) , (4)
P(αℓ|K) = P(K|αℓ)P(αℓ)
P(K)
. (5)
As both M|C and α form complete sets of alternatives we obtain the evidence terms
P(αℓD|C) =
N(M)∑
n=1
∫
Ωn
dω pn(ω|C)P(αℓD|MnωC) , (6)
P(K) =
∑
ℓ
P(K|αℓ)P(αℓ) , (7)
where we have written the model likelihoods P(αℓD|MnC) explicitly as integrals over
their constrained parameter p.d.f.s pn(ω|C), fulfilling
∑
n
∫
Ωn
dω pn(ω|C) = 1.
Priors and Likelihoods of Association. Associations by itself are just abstract com-
bination of numbers. Without referring to data or physical models, we have to assign the
same value P(αℓ)> 0 for all ℓ, except for some αℓ which can be excluded with certainty
(e.g., P(αℓ) = 0 if αℓ0 = 0). As a constant prior P(α) cancels in Eqs. 5 and 7, we can set
P(αℓ) = 1 in all terms with P(αℓ) 6= 0.
The likelihood of an association is determined by two contributions: (a) the proba-
bility of an associated data point to be observed at a effective distance θ¯jk within an
effective accuracy δ¯jk, and (b) the confusion probability ψj(k) to have a given number k
of unrelated data points in a catalog of mean source density ηj within a radius ∆j , i.e.,
the Poisson probability
ψj(k) =
(π∆2jηj)
k
k!
e−π∆
2
jηj . (8)
The effective distance and accuracy consider the seed position error δj0 by defining
θ¯jk =
√
θ2jk+ δ
2
j0 and δ¯jk =
√
δ2jk+ δ
2
j0, thus P(Kjk|αℓ) ∝ (θ¯jk/δ¯jk) exp(−θ¯2jk/2δ¯2jk). It is
then straightforward to see1,3 that
H(αℓ|K) =
N(D)∑
j=1
αℓj>0
(
log
[
δ¯jαℓj
θ¯jαℓj ψ(N(Dj)−1)
]
+
1
2
[
θ¯2jαℓj
δ¯2jαℓj
−1
])
−
N(D)∑
j=1
αℓj=0
logψ
(
N(Dj)
)
. (9)
The seed catalog does not contribute to this term as its association is logically implied.
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Priors and Likelihoods of Classification. Priors in classification are given by the
model parameter p.d.f.s, the functional shape of which is part of the model generation
and will not be discussed here. For the normalization of the prior p.d.f.s, relative abun-
dances of known object classes from previous classifications can be used.
The classification likelihood is the probability of the data points and non-observations
in αℓD to match with the model prediction, and we can write
H(Mnω|DC) = χ
2
2
−
N(D)∑
j=1
αℓj=0
logerfc
[
1√
2
(
µni(xj ;ω)
σj0
−νj
)]
. (10)
The second term considers the contribution of assumed non-observations, and
χ2 =
N(D)∑
j=1
αℓj>0
N(Djk)∑
i=1
(
fjαℓji−µni(xj ;ω)
σjαℓji
)2
(11)
is the usual “goodness-of-fit” measure for the data points in αℓD.2,3
Classifying Objects
Definition and Properties of Confidence. Following Jaynes [7, § 4] we use the log-
arithm of the odds ratio to compare our classifications and define the confidence of a
candidate object αℓMn as
cℓn = log
(
P(αℓMn|DC)
1−P(αℓMn|DC)
)
. (12)
The object of choice would then be the candidate object with maximum confidence,
cmax, and we denote the corresponding indices as ℓmax and nmax. Analogously, we can
define the confidence of a data association as
aℓ = log
(
P(αℓ|K)
1−P(αℓ|K)
)
(13)
and denote value and index of the maximum as amax and ℓˆmax, respectively.
Eq. 3 implies that cℓn<aℓ for all n. Because of {{αℓMn}}≀, we can have cℓn> 0 for only
one combination ℓn. As this implies aℓ > 0, it can be taken as a condition for a unique
and consistent object choice, preferring one αℓMn over all others. In the contrary, we
cannot conclude from aℓ > 0 that cmax > 0, neither we can conclude that ℓ= ℓmax.
1 Likelihoods containing contributions from both data point associations (Gaussian p.d.f.s) and non-
observations (probabilities) require to define conditions to normalize the relative contribution of both
kind of terms. In H(αℓ|K) this is done by requiring P(Kjk|αℓ)→ 1 for matching coordinates measured
with arbitrary precision, θjk < δjk < δj0→ 0.
2 Here we require that for the fiducial case µni(xj ;ω) = νjσj0, the probability of a data point {νjσj0,σj0}
to be consistent with the model prediction is equal to the probability of a non-observation.
3 We use Gaussian p.d.f.s as we assumed in our data structure that only one error parameter is given for
each position or quantity. If more detailed error information is available, the definition of the correspond-
ing likelihoods has to be adapted.
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Quality Rating. Based on the discussion above, we can define for each object a qual-
ity rating, defining potential actions to be taken for catalog validation and verification.
The most basic scheme would contain four ratings as follows.
Rating A selects clear cases, and is given for cmax ≥ Clim > 3nat, corresponding to a
rejection probability of the best alternative of > 95% (1nat = 4.34db). No or little human
inspection is necessary in these cases, and results of rejected object associations can be
deleted. Rating B would be applied for cmax ≥ 0, and indicates likely cases, while rating
C would be applied to potentially ambiguous cases with amax ≥ 0 while cmax < 0. Both
require human inspection at different levels, and all results with cℓn∼ cmax should be kept
for validation. Finally, a rating D (amax < 0) identifies objects which would normally be
rejected in catalog generation, but which may still be interesting to look at for research
purposes. Of course, this scheme may be adapted to the needs of reliability, and it may
make sense to split up rating A using a sequence of increasing Clim.
Odd Objects Our plan is to drop a lot of odd objects
onto your country from the air.
And some of these objects will be useful.
And some of them will just be odd.
Laurie Anderson
Counter-evidence. We are left with a problem: Assume there is an object which does
not fit into any of our model classes. How would it appear in our classification?
Obviously, for such objects all integrals in the sum of Eq. 6 would become very
small, so P(αℓD|C) would become very small, even if the data association has a high
confidence. We therefore introduce the counter-evidence for an associated object to fit
into the classification scheme as
κℓ =− log P(αℓD|C)≡H(C|αℓD) (14)
and κ=min(κℓ). Thus, κ can be seen as the information Hamiltonian of the classification
scheme, taken for the association for which it becomes minimal. Large values for κ are
an indication of classification exceptions. Following the US performance artist Laurie
Anderson4 we call such cases odd objects: While exceptions are usually expected to be
results of instrumental errors or defects in the target catalogs (“just odd”), they could
also indicate the discovery or a new, unexpected object type (“useful”).
Introducing an exception class. That our method mingles candidates for rejection
with candidates for discovery is a defect obtained by forcing the condition P(M|C) = 1
onto an, in principle arbitrary, classification scheme C. To overcome this problem, we
introduce an odd-object class M0 defined by a single parameter
ξ ≡− log(P(αℓD|M0) P(M0)) (15)
for all αℓD. As M0 is the logical complement of the set M, we have {{M0,Mn}}≀ without
conditions, and we obtain the total evidence
P(αℓD) =P(αℓD|C)+ e−ξ . (16)
4 Laurie Anderson, United States Live, Warner Bros. (1983)
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This implies cℓ0 = κℓ− ξ, and we define the confidence for an object to be odd as
c0 ≡ κ− ξ . (17)
Moreover, objects of classes Mn need to fulfill P(αℓD|Mn)P(Mn)> e−ξ for some ℓn in
order to receive a rating B or above, while there was no such limit in C. To prevent that
odd objects are accidentally considered “clear cases” if P(αℓD|Mn)P(Mn)≪ e−ξ for all
ℓn, we introduce a sub-rating Ao ⊂ A for c0 > Clim, which requires human inspection.
DISCUSSION AND PHILOSOPHICAL EPILOGUE
Benefits of Bayesian Classification
Models and Priors: Experience vs. Bias. In Bayesian classification we use models
and priors, which are usually suspected in catalog generation to introduce bias. Shouldn’t
we use only the information contained in the given data set in order to be objective?
Our Bayesian answer is: No, we shouldn’t, and in fact, we never do. In general, it is
the advantage of Bayesian methods to clearly state our priors, while orthodox methods
often hide the prior assumptions used. For the special case of catalog generation, this
means that we always have additional data available, usually in a complex and incoherent
form, and also widely accepted models describing the nature of our potential objects,
and these data and models are used by “experienced astronomers” in the process called
catalog validation. All we do by introducing models and priors is to automate part of this
experience, i.e., provide a condensed description of our prior knowledge and beliefs to
the classification procedure. Our quality rating ensures that this affects only the trivial,
routine tasks of validation, and prevents that potentially interesting alternatives to the
best assignments are prematurely dropped (e.g., cases with ℓmax 6= ℓˆmax).
Beyond Best Fits: Robustness and Model Complexity. Our method exhibits a fun-
damental aspect of Bayesian classification: Model parameters are not optimized as in
“best-fit” approaches, but marginalized in Eq. 4 and 6. We emphasize that this is im-
plied by plausibility logic: It is not our question which model can produce an optimal
fit to the data for some parameter choice, but which model explains the data in the most
natural way, given prior expectations for its parameters.
To discuss this in more detail, let us consider one parameter dimension ωi of the
model parameter space Ωn, and assume that pn(ω) ≈ pn(ω\i)/|Ωni|, with for ωi ∈ Ωni
and pn(ω) ≃ 0 otherwise. Moreover, we assume that for ωi = 0 we achieve H0ni ≡
H(Mn\i|αℓD) integrated over all parameter dimensions except ωi. Varying ωi may de-
crease H(Mn\i|αℓD) to a value ∼ H+ni  H0ni (i.e., increase the likelihood) in some
regime ωi ∈ η+ni, while it decreases the likelihood (H(Mn\i|αℓD) ∼H−ni H0ni) in some
other regime ωi ∈ η−ni. Everywhere else we assume H(Mn\i|αℓD)∼H0ni. Defining
Λ±ni =±
(
eH
0
ni−H
±
ni−1
)
and W±ni =
|η±ni|
|Ωni| , (18)
we immediately obtain for the change in confidence caused by parameter ωi[
∆cℓn
]
ωi
∼ log(1+Λ+niW+ni−Λ−niW−ni) . (19)
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A significant increase of the model confidence is only obtained if Λ+niW+ni−Λ−niW−ni  1,
i.e., if a significant net improvement of the fit quality averaged over the “prior mass” Ωni
of the parameter is achieved. We shall call parameters with this property robust, while
parameters with Λ+niW+ni . Λ−niW−ni shall be called fragile.
The factors Wi are equivalent to the Ockham factors defined by Jaynes [7, § 20],
referring to the principle of simplicity known as Ockhams razor. However, Eq. 19 shows
that Bayesian logic does not lead to a flat penalization of model complexity; rather, a
parameter which does not affect the fit quality (W+ni =W−ni =0) does not affect the model
confidence. It therefore seems more appropriate to say that Bayesian logic penalizes fine
tuning, i.e., the introduction of fragile parameters with little prior constraints for the
mere purpose to improve the “best fit” for some particular choice of parameter values.5
Bayesian Learning: Updating the Classification Scheme. Classification is naturally
applied to a large number of objects O ≡ {[αDM]s}⊥, which allows us to use posterior
number distributions to iteratively update all prior assumptions which we have entered.
In particular total model priors P(Mn) can be updated as
N(O|n,A)
N(O|A) ≻P(Mn) , (20)
where O|A [O|n,A] denotes the set of all A rated objects [in model class n]. In the same
way, updates can be applied to the shape of prior p.d.f.s of the models, if these are
determined by empirical parameters.
The most important parameter for posterior updates is hereby the odd object threshold
ξ. If we consider P(Mn) determined by Eq. 20 as a function of ξ and call it R0(ξ),
we note that R0(0) = 1 and R0(ξ) → 0 for ξ →∞. If classification exceptions hide a
class of undiscovered objects with particular properties, we would expect that they are
grouped around some large value of a ξ, while all objects fitting into the classification
scheme have small values of ξ. In between, we expect a range where R0(ξ) remains
approximately constant, and a good choice of ξ for separating the two populations is
then found by maximizing
ε(ξ) = ξ+
d
dξ
logR0(ξ) (21)
within the range of ξ where R0(ξ) > 0. Once ξ is found, we can update all model priors
by Eq. 20.
In principle, every update is a redefinition of the classification scheme C, and the goal
of our iterative process is to find a converging chain of updates C≻C′ ≻C′′ ≻ . . ., until a
self consistent result is obtained. If this does not succeed, our conclusion might be that
the classification task is ill-defined, and we may exchange our classification scheme C
by an entirely different C∗, containing other models to define object classes.
5 In his discussion of this topic on p. 605-607 of his book [7], Jaynes implicitly assumes that the likelihood
is significantly different from zero only within η+ni. If a moderately good match H
0
ni has been achieved
without the parameter ωi, this is equivalent to setting Λ−ni = 1 and W
−
ni = 1−W+ni in Eq. 19, yielding
[∆cℓn]ωi ∼H+ni−H0ni+ logW+ni. Now the Ockham factor indeed penalizes the model complexity as it
requires H+ni H
0
ni− logW+ni for significant improvement of confidence (note that logW+ni < 0).
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Classification and Inference
Interpretation Schemes and Anomalies. With these considerations we make the link
from Bayesian classification to Bayesian inference. There, we confront a set of models
or theories — we call it the interpretation scheme I — with a series of data sets Ds,
which we now call tests of the interpretation scheme, expecting that subsequent tests
will lead to a more and more reliable estimation of the free parameters in our model
space. Occasionally, however, results of experiments will not fit at all into the picture
(κ ≫ 1), and we then call them anomalies. Normally, we will cope with anomalies
by successively extending the parameter spaces of models (I ≻ I′ ≻ I′′ ≻ . . .), but if
anomalies become rampant, we will have to doubt the validity of our interpretation
scheme as a whole. This may lead us to replace it with a new scheme involving entirely
new theories (I→ I∗), involving a reinterpretation of all data sets observed so far.
The Course of Science in a Bayesian View. The gentle reader may have noticed
that our interpretation scheme is what Thomas Kuhn has called a paradigm [8]. In a
Bayesian language, it is that part of our “web of beliefs” which is kept unchanged in
technical applications, slowly modified in the normal course of science, but questioned
and eventually been overthrown when confronted with overwhelming anomalies. We
have identified the counter-evidence as a measure to monitor such developments.
We may write I(t) for an interpretation scheme continuously modified over time,
and define κ¯(t) as its average counter-evidence. I(t) can then be identified with Imre
Lakatos’ concept of a research programme [9], and the sign of dκ¯/dt would indicate
whether it is “progressing” (dκ¯/dt < 0) or “degenerating” (dκ¯/dt > 0). Degeneration of
a research programme — or the decline of a paradigm — is hereby not only caused by
experimental anomalies, but also by fragile parameters introduced to cope with them. At
the end of the road, we may enter into that what Kuhn calls a scientific revolution, the
incommensurable paradigm shift I→I∗, by which all known data obtain a new meaning
[8]. A further exploration of these topics would be beyond the scope of this paper, but it is
intriguing to note how Bayesian methods allow a quantitative understanding of concepts
in the philosophy of science which are otherwise considered irrational.
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